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Introduction by Javier Aríztegui, Deputy Governor, Banco de España 
The V High-Level Seminar of Eurosystem and Latin American Central Banks, held in Madrid 
last December was a special occasion to gather the governors of the euro area and Latin 
America for a fruitful exchange of views on the economic and financial situation of both areas. 
It was also a unique opportunity to assess, with the benefit of some hindsight, the evolution 
and performance of Latin American central banks prior to, within and after the crisis. With this 
purpose in mind, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel was commissioned to write an essay on the issue, 
to be presented in a Lecture previous to the Seminar. Professor Schmidt-Hebbel is one of 
the leading economists in the region and one of the most reputed experts in monetary 
economics and, in particular, in the analysis of inflation targeting. He has worked as Chief of 
the Economic Research Division in the Central Bank of Chile for 12 years and was Chief 
Economist of the OECD between 2008 and 2009. 
Taking advantage of the presence of central bank governors of the two regions, 
a discussion was scheduled after the lecture, led by two prominent discussants, which 
provided a view from the trenches of actual policymaking. Agustin Carstens, Governor of the 
Banco de México and Athanasios Orphanides, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus. 
Their contributions are also included in this publication.* 
The lecture and the discussions provide an in-depth overview of the current state 
of the art in central banking in Latin America. The region has a history of recurrent financial 
crises that took a large toll on economic growth and fuelled social unrest. Frequently, 
these crises were triggered by external shocks, but they unveiled severe macroeconomic 
and financial weaknesses, leading to banking crises in some cases. Financial crises, thus, 
became a primary source of macroeconomic instability, a drag for economic development 
and a reason for social frustration. 
Fortunately, politicians and policymakers have in the last decades learned from 
previous mistakes, as the essay describes in detail, and, consequently, in 2007 Latin America 
was better prepared to cope with real and financial shocks. Over time, most countries 
strengthened their macroeconomic fundamentals and built up buffer mechanisms to 
mitigate the negative effects of frequent exogenous shocks. They built up a sound, 
well regulated and supervised banking sector, dedicated to retail banking, combining 
international and domestic firms. These factors have proven effective to deal with the current 
economic and financial crisis. 
In the area of monetary policy the progress has also been noteworthy and with 
its own specifities. Most Latin American countries shifted to flexible exchange rates and 
inflation targeting regimes but, in contrast with advanced economies, they also significantly 
increased their international reserves and applied banking requirements and other measures 
to stem financial excesses, including in some extreme cases, some capital controls. These 
two elements were seen at the time as transitional devices, as the new regime took hold and 
financial development deepened. However, with the experience provided by the crisis and the 
concern developed by central banks for preserving financial stability, that approach appears 
* The discussions are based on the version the paper given in the Lecture. This version has subsequently been revised by the
author, so that some comments might not apply to this new version (Note of the Editor).
now to incorporate some virtues and a high degree of pragmatism. Indeed, the success in 
weathering the financial storm in Latin America is outstanding, and shows the benefits 
of learning the right lessons from previous financial crisis. It comes as a coincidence that the 
year that Latin American countries start to celebrate their bicentenaries of independence, 
the region seems to have achieved its emancipation from a turbulent financial past, too. 
However, new challenges arise for Latin American central banks, as Professor 
Schmidt-Hebbel forcefully argues in his essay. Overall, in my view, the main one is preserving 
the recent progress in terms of monetary policymaking as the global economy adapts to 
a new and uncertain context. This document provides some key guidelines to succeed 
in this goal. 
Abstract 
Lecture. CENTRAL BANKING IN LATIN AMERICA: CHANGES, ACHIEVEMENTS, 
CHALLENGES by Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel 
Latin America’s central banks were strengthened in the 1990s by independence laws, adoption 
of new policy regimes (foremost inflation targeting), and more transparent policy decisions  
bound by ex-ante  rules and ex-post accountability. Central bank modernization – supported 
by significant fiscal adjustment and financial-sector strengthening – led most Latin American 
countries to converge to one-digit inflation rates and contributed to higher and more stable 
growth than in the past. Yet the region’s new policy framework was put to severe testing by 
the global financial crisis and recession. Quick and innovative policy responses by the region’s 
central banks helped domestic financial systems and the real economy to resist well the 
massive financial and real consequences of the banking crisis and recession in industrial 
countries. Empirical evidence reported here shows that the central banks’ new policy 
framework and policy response during the crisis dampened significantly the amplitude of the 
recession. Having weathered well the global financial crisis and recession, now Latin America’s 
central banks face a large array of policy challenges, which are reviewed in this lecture. Some 
are common to central banks in industrial and emerging economies, derived from the crisis 
itself and the issues it poses for improving the role of central banks in attaining more effectively 
both monetary and financial stability. Other challenges are idiosyncratic to emerging economies 
in the region (and elsewhere) that are facing renewed growth, high commodity prices, large 
capital inflows, and real exchange-rate appreciation. 
 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, O54. 
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Central Banks, Latin America. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1102 
1 Introduction 
Central banks evolve over time. A generation ago the conduct of monetary, exchange-rate, 
and financial stability policies in most central banks was opaque, discretionary, and 
unpredictable, not bound by well-defined policy regimes, institutions, and rules. Many central 
banks – particularly those in developing countries – lacked independence from governments 
and were little more than money printing offices for governments keen to finance their 
perennial deficits with inflation taxation. 
Slowly since the 1980s, and more quickly since the 1990s and 2000s, central banks 
worldwide have been strengthened by independence laws, adoption of new policy regimes 
(like inflation targeting), and more transparent policy decisions that are bound by ex-ante rules 
and ex-post accountability. This has been the result of a growing consensus among 
policymakers and academics that rules are better than discretion – both for democratic 
accountability and economic efficiency. Certainly the latter objective has been intellectually 
supported by modern macroeconomic theory shaped by the rational expectations revolution, 
the Lucas critique [Lucas (1976)], and the arguments in support of policy rules over discretion 
[Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983)]. 
Nowhere has been this change more profound than in Latin America (LA). 
After decades of money-financed government deficits, high and hyper-inflation episodes, 
and recurring banking and balance-of-payments crisis, central banks were granted de jure 
or de facto independence. This enabled the region’s central banks to adopt policy regimes 
that are at the international best-practice frontier, supportive of effective policy-making 
in pursuance of well-defined objectives of monetary and financial stability. Central bank 
modernization was supported by significant fiscal adjustment and financial-sector 
strengthening through improved regulation and supervision. This led most LA countries 
to converge to one-digit inflation rates during the last decade and contributed to higher 
and more stable growth than in the past. Hence LA took active part in the world’s Great 
Moderation experience. 
Yet the region’s new policy framework was put to severe testing by the global 
financial crisis and recession, which grew out of many industrial countries’ excesses incurred 
during the Great Moderation period. Surprising to many observers, LA’s domestic financial 
system and international payments position resisted very well the massive financial and real 
consequences of banking crises and recessions in industrial countries. As opposed to past 
experiences, no LA economy went through a financial crisis. The intensity of LA’s recession 
was limited and short-lived, followed by strong recovery. Yet it is precisely this recovery, 
fueled by high commodity prices and large capital flows, which poses risks for the region, 
implying new challenges for its central banks. The latter are added to the challenges posed by 
the global crisis to all central banks in the world in their pursuit of monetary and financial 
stability. 
In this lecture I review the institutional changes and stabilization achievements of 
LA’s central banks and discuss key policy challenges faced by the region’s central banks 
today. Section 2 looks back at past reforms in central banks’ institutional set-up, regimes, 
and policies. This paves the way for assessing macroeconomic and policy achievements in 
section 3. In section 4 I describe the response of central banks to the 2008-09 global financial 
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crisis and recession, and assess quantitatively the contribution of central bank policies to 
dampen the recessionary impact in Latin America. I review the double set of challenges 
posed by the current juncture to the region’s central banks (and governments) in section 5. 
Concluding remarks close the paper. 
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2 Looking back at the Reforms: Deep Changes in Central Banking Institutions, 
Regimes, and Policies, 1990-2010 
2.1 Central bank independence and transparency 
From their beginnings at different dates in the twentieth century and until the 1990s, LA’s 
central banks lacked independence from governments, which resulted in high inflation and 
recurring banking crises. Central bank reserves were often under attack as a result of policy 
inconsistency arising from exchange-rate pegs and high inflation. 
The world-wide rise of monetarism and the rational-expectations revolution of the 
1970s and the 1980s, combined with the region’s growing revulsion against continuing high 
and hyper-inflation in the late 1980s, led to deep central bank reforms in the 1990s – a clear 
example of “crises that beget reforms” [Bruno and Easterly (1996)]. Reforms were anchored 
in new central bank laws adopted between 1989 and 2002 (Table 2.1). The new laws 
gave banks a clear mandate, focused on currency or price stability; granted banks political 
independence in regime choice and policy design; provided operational autonomy to 
banks; and made banks accountable to congress and the general public [Carstens and 
Jácome (2005)]. 
Table 2.1: New Central Bank Laws in Latin America, 1989-2002 
Source: Carstens and Jácome (2005). 
How much was central bank independence (CBI) strengthened by the new 
laws? I follow the previous literature on CBI [Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (2002), 
Carstens and Jácome (2005), Jácome and Vázquez (2005)], distinguishing between political 
independence (an aggregate index for different measures of CB board independence and 
focus on price stability as key policy objective) and economic independence (independence 
in policy formulation and conduct, and on central bank financing from government). 
LA central banks show major improvements in both dimensions since the 1990s.1 Inflation 
targeting (IT) central banks – which lagged behind non-IT central banks in both measures 
of independence in 1984-1992, before they adopted new laws and IT – attained higher 
levels of independence in 1993-2005, in comparison to non-IT countries (Figure 2.1). 
With stronger legal independence granted to central banks came stronger 
legal requirements of accountability and transparency. Supported by the new laws, 
                                                                          
1. I use the data assembled by Jácome and Vázquez (2005), who extend and apply the Cukierman (1992) CBI measure 
to LA’s central banks. 
Country Date of New Laws Country Date of New Laws 
Chile 1989 Mexico 1993 
El Salvador 1991 Bolivia 1995 
Argentina 1992 and 2002 Costa Rica 1995
Colombia 1992 Uruguay 1995 
Nicaragua 1992 and 1999 Paraguay 1995 
Venezuela 1992, 1999, and 2002 Honduras 1996 and 2004 
Ecuador 1992 and 1998 Guatemala 2001
Peru 1993 Dominican Republic 2002
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1102 
LA’s central banks have improved significantly their accountability and transparency 
requirements since the 1990s (Figure 2.2). 
How transparent have central banks become in practice, as a result of both legal and 
de facto changes in central bank policy and communications practice? Based on Dincer 
and Eichengreen’s (2010) world database on central bank transparency, Latin American 
central banks exhibit steady improvements in aggregate transparency during 1998-2006 
(Figure 2.3). LA’s five IT central banks exhibit transparency levels that are significantly 
higher than those observed in LA’s non-IT central banks and other emerging economies’ 
central banks. 
Figure 2.1: Central Bank Independence Measures for Inflation-Targeting and Non 
Inflation- Targeting Countries in Latin America, 1984-1992 and 1993-2005 
 
Note: IT countries comprise Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (No data is available for Brazil covering 
1984-1992). Non-IT countries comprise Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Source: Jácome and Vázquez (2005). 
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Figure 2.2: Central Bank Legal Accountability and Transparency Measure for 
Inflation-Targeting and Non Inflation-Targeting Countries in Latin America,  
1984-1992 and 1993-2005 
 
Note: IT countries comprise Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (No data is available for Brazil covering 
1984-1992). Non-IT countries comprise Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Source: Jácome and Vázquez (2005). 
 
Figure 2.3: Central Bank Transparency Measures by Country Groups, 1998-2006 
 
Note: LA IT countries comprise Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. LA Non IT countries comprise 
Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay. The other two groups are comprised by 13 industrial 
countries and 78 developing countries. 
Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2010). 
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Summary information on central bank measures of de jure independence, de jure 
accountability and transparency, and de facto transparency is reported for individual countries 
and country groups in Table 2.2. The data reflect relatively high levels of independence and 
transparency attained by the region’s central banks in recent years. IT central banks exhibit 
generally higher levels of both measures than non-IT central banks in the region. 
Table 2.2: Measures of Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and 
Transparency in Latin America 
De Jure
Independence
(1993-2005)
De Jure
Accountability
and Transparency
(1993-2005)
De facto
Transparency
(2006)
0.608.047.0aciremAnitaL
5.7886.0445.0lizarB
5.71688.0elihC
5839.0228.0aibmoloC
5.5839.0708.0ocixeM
8886.0688.0ureP
5.51437.0anitnegrA
-578.0468.0aiviloB
-886.0926.0aciRatsoC
-313.0847.0rodaucE
3057.0597.0rodavlaSlE
-839.0746.0sarudnoH
-318.0475.0augaraciN
-057.0817.0yaugaraP
5886.0256.0yaugurU
-578.0837.0aleuzeneV
 
Sources: Jácome and Vázquez (2005) for de jure independence and accountability; Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2008) for de facto transparency. 
Table 2.3: Exchange-Rate and Monetary Regimes in Latin America, 2008 
Exchange Rate Regime
Monetary Policy Framework
Exchange Rate
Anchor (US$)
Monetary
Aggregate
Inflation
Targeting Other
No separate legal tender
Ecuador
El Salvador
Panama
Conventional Fixed Peg
Argentina
Honduras
Venezuela
Argentina
Crawling Peg BoliviaNicaragua
Crawling Band Costa Rica
Managed Floating with no
predetermined Path for
Exchange Rate
Colombia
Guatemala
Peru
Uruguay
Dominican Republic
Paraguay
Independently Floating
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
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2.2 Exchange-Rate and Monetary Regimes 
Latin America is the region that exemplifies best the two-corner hypothesis in exchange-rate 
(ER) regimes, i.e., the shift from intermediate regimes toward fixed and floating ER systems. 
While intermediate regimes were prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s, most countries migrated 
toward pegs or floats in the late 1990s. According to the IMF, as of 2008 a majority of 
LA countries had in place a managed float or an independent float, and a smaller number 
had adopted either a fixed peg to the US dollar or had replaced their currency by the 
latter currency (Table 2.3). Most countries with a managed or independent float are IT 
countries – an obvious pairing as full-fledged IT is inconsistent with any anchor other than the 
inflation target. 
Among floating ER regimes, managed floats are prevalent in the region – only Chile 
and Mexico come closest to clean floats. “Fear to floating” – reflected in frequent ER market 
interventions – is still dominant in the region, and responds to different policy objectives: 
building up higher liquidity over time, avoiding financial turbulence or crisis derived from large 
ER depreciation in countries that are highly dollarized or with significant dollar-denominated 
net foreign debt, minimizing loss of competitiveness as a result of significant real ER 
appreciation,2 reducing ER pass-through to inflation, and pricking ER bubbles or large 
deviations of market ERs from fundamentals-driven equilibrium ER levels. In the absence of 
deep and healthy domestic financial markets (including well-developed ER derivative 
markets), well-anchored inflation expectations, and strong domestic counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic and macro-prudential policies, ER interventions could represent a 
second-best policy instrument to counter-act market and policy failures that are behind the 
policy objectives of interventions that I have listed above. Yet the possible (but often elusive) 
benefits of ER interventions have to be carefully balanced against their costs, derived from 
the limitations that interventions impose on ER flexibility and full monetary independence. 
ER interventions by central banks in the region are of two types. Opaque 
interventions with little ex ante communication about intervention objectives, instruments, 
amounts, and periods are prevalent. The exception is Chile, where interventions are 
pre-announced by the central bank, which communicates the period and amount of its 
relatively exceptional interventions. A large body of empirical research on ER interventions by 
central banks in the world shows scant evidence about their effectiveness. Some evidence 
for Chile suggests that intervention announcements (as opposed to actual interventions) 
has positive but short-lived effects on ER levels, suggesting that they could break episodes 
of non-fundamentals driven appreciation or depreciation [Tapia and Tokman (2004), 
De Gregorio and Tokman (2004)]. 
Now I turn to monetary regimes. Inflation targets were generally adopted in the 
1990s and 2000s once LA central banks had shifted from fixed or intermediate ER regimes to 
                                                                          
2. Regarding the relation between growth and the real ER (or competitiveness), ER policy should acknowledge the 
bi-causal relation between both variables: growth contributes to equilibrium real ER appreciation while disequilibrium 
real ER appreciation harms growth. Trend real ER appreciation is a likely and unavoidable by-product of high growth, 
consistent with the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) hypothesis. Successful emerging economies – those that are on a 
sustained path of convergence toward industrial-country pre capita income levels – should be prepared to “suffer” from 
trend real ER appreciation. Consistent with the HBS hypothesis, their relative prices of traded goods will rise in reflection 
of their large relative productivity gains in traded-goods- (export-) producing sectors. However, as is the case of any 
asset price, ERs may be subject to bubbles, i.e., to periods of significant (and rising) separation of market ERs from 
fundamentals-driven equilibrium ERs. Extended and significant disequilibrium real ER appreciation may harm growth, 
as shown by international panel-data studies [Aguirre and Calderón (2005) and Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2008)]. Although equilibrium ERs are not observable, central banks are called to assess if significant ER disequilibrium 
arises when considering ER interventions. 
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floats. Yet, as opposed to industrial countries but like in many other emerging economies, all 
LA central banks started IT by pre-committing to annual target levels on a declining schedule 
toward stationary target levels. During this phase of “converging targets”, central banks used 
IT as an instrument to anchor inflation expectations to forward-looking target levels, bringing 
inflation gradually down. At low single-digit levels of actual inflation, central banks adopted 
stationary target levels. During the convergence period, IT central banks invested heavily 
in developing their IT framework, moving gradually from partial to full-fledged IT, with all the 
bells and whistles of international best-practice IT. This involved modernizing monetary 
policy operations, improving analytical and forecasting capabilities, revamping policy decision 
procedures, and raising transparency, communications, and accountability of central bank 
work and policy decisions. Since circa 2000, IT central banks publish regular inflation reports. 
In gradually improving their IT framework, LA inflation central banks were not different from 
those in other regions, including industrial-country central banks, which also shifted gradually 
to full-fledged IT, several  years after its adoption [Batini and Laxton (2007)]. 
LA’s central banks modernized radically their operational framework for monetary 
policy since the 1990s. This was the result of their policy objective set on monetary stability 
and their attempt to close the gap with industrial countries’ best policy practice. The new 
framework was centered on the control of systemic banks’ liquidity, the use of a short-term 
interest rate or a quantity variable as the main policy instrument, and the adoption of more 
transparent policy rules and policy decision procedures [Carstens and Jácome (2005)]. 
The latter framework has been fully adopted by IT central banks – and to a lesser degree 
by non-IT central banks in the region – due to the larger dependence of the success of IT on 
a well-structured and transparent monetary framework. 
All five major IT countries in LA – and several non-IT countries – use an overnight 
benchmark or monetary policy rate as their operational variable. They engage in over-night 
repo and reverse repo operations to steer the overnight inter-bank market rate close to 
the monetary policy rate. In contrast, many non-IT countries use a quantity variable as their 
key operational variable, such as base money or net domestic assets. 
Short-term nominal interest rates exhibit a strong downward trend in LA’s major 
economies since the early 1990s, reflecting declining inflation and lower real interest 
rates due to successful stabilization (Figure 2.4).3 The shift from fixed or intermediate to 
more flexible ER regimes and better-anchored inflation expectations paved the way for a 
radical change in central bank response to international and domestic crises. While under 
the old regime central banks raised interest rates in response to adverse foreign and 
domestic shocks, defending non-flexible exchange rates (e.g., in 1998), many central banks 
were able to reduce interest rates ten years later, in response to the global crisis. 
                                                                          
3. Much of the regional data presented below corresponds to unweighted averages for the seven major LA economies 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) and for the five IT countries among the latter. 
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Figure 2.4: Short-Term Nominal Interest Rate in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
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Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela.   
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
2.3 Financial development, integration, and stability 
After the 1982-1985 Latin American debt and banking crisis, most countries revamped 
deeply commercial bank regulation and supervision, adopting strong banking laws that 
limit risk taking and lifting restrictions on foreign investment in banking that led to increased 
domestic competition. Supported further by capital market and pension system reforms, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and overall development, banking systems matured and 
developed. Financial intermediation and financial system depth grew very significantly during 
the past two decades, while banking system health was improved. When the global financial 
crisis hit in 2008, regulatory risk-weighted capital to asset ratios stood at values ranging from 
11.9% (Peru) to 18.3% (Brazil), roughly twice the rations observed in industrial countries. 
Central banks contributed to financial stability in two ways: by exercising or sharing bank 
regulation and supervision with governments and by monitoring domestic financial stability, 
as reflected in their regular financial stability reports, published since the mid-2000s. 
In the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian Crisis and together with adoption of flexible 
ER regimes, many central banks supported their countries’ international financial integration 
by ditching controls on capital outflows and inflows that had been in place for many decades 
until the 1990s. This contributed to higher international financial integration in the seven major 
economies. Their average sum of external asset and liability ratios to GDP rose from close to 
90% in the 1990s to close to 120% in the 2000s (Table 2.5). A growing body of cross-country 
research shows that higher financial openness and integration into world capital markets 
raises  long-term growth and lowers long-term growth volatility [Calderón et al. (2006, 2008)] 
– and LA is not an exception from this world pattern. 
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Table 2.4: Banks’ Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios in  
Latin America, 2005-2010 (%) 
Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets
(In Percent)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Average 15.4 15.0 14.6 14.7 15.4 15.6 15.1
Argentina 15.3 16.8 16.9 16.8 18.7 18.4 17.2
Bolivia 14.7 13.3 12.6 13.7 13.3 12.3 13.3
Brazil 17.9 18.9 18.7 18.3 18.8 17.5 18.4
6.313.415.212.215.210.31elihC 13.0
Colombi 14.7 13.1 13.6 13.4 12.1 12.8 13.3
Costa Ric 18.0 18.4 15.7 15.1 15.9 16.4 16.6
Dominican Republic 12.5 12.4 13.0 13.4 14.5 14.5 13.4
Ecuador 11.6 12.0 12.5 13.0 13.8 13.1 12.7
El Salvador 13.5 13.8 13.8 14.5 16.2 16.9 14.8
Guatemala 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.5 15.4 15.1 14.2
Mexico 14.3 16.1 15.9 15.3 15.9 16.4 15.7
Panama 16.8 15.8 14.5 14.8 16.4 16.6 15.8
Paraguay 20.4 20.1 16.8 18.2 16.4 18.0 18.3
Peru 12.0 12.5 12.1 11.9 13.5 14.3 12.7
Uruguay 22.7 16.9 17.8 16.7 17.0 18.5 18.3
Venezuela 15.5 14.3 12.9 13.4 13.9 15.5 14.3
 
Source: IMF (2010) Global Financial Stability Report, cited in Powell (2010). 
However, full financial integration may raise domestic vulnerability to large 
swings in capital flows, impairing macroeconomic and financial stability in the absence of 
well-regulated, sound domestic financial markets and effective counter-cyclical policies. 
Therefore controls on capital inflows are sometimes adopted and justified as a second-best 
policy choice when first-best solutions are not available, and when the stabilizing effects 
of capital controls are perceived to outweigh the costs derived from the financial distortions 
they imply. However, a significant literature on the effectiveness and the costs of capital 
controls imposed in the 1990s by emerging economies is largely inconclusive [e.g., Ostry 
et al. (2010)].4 Nonetheless, an intense policy discussion on the merits of capital controls in 
emerging economies is resurfacing, and some countries that face large capital inflows have 
already adopted or are considering adoption of controls, as I will discuss below in the region’s 
context. 
Table 2.5: External Asset and Liability Ratios to GDP in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
                                                                          
4. The most researched country experience is Chile’s 1991-1999 unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) that taxed 
foreign loans and portfolio inflows at an implicit rate that declined asymptotically with length of stay or maturity of 
the corresponding financial transaction. A majority of circa 15 empirical studies concluded that the URR did neither 
reduce aggregate capital inflows nor affect the real ER significantly but did alter the composition of inflows toward 
longer maturities. This came at the cost of higher short-term domestic interest rates, more difficult access of smaller 
firms to external financing, and partial evasion and elusion of controls [Gallego et al. (2002), Ostry et al. (2010)]. 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Argentina 78.5 103.8 176.5 147.6 
Brazil 45.8 53.22 86.8 82.9 
Chile 119.0 126.9 192.1 184.6 
Colombia 51.7 61.6 87.1 79.0 
Mexico 63.0 81.8 70.3 79.5 
Peru 98.0 100.9 103.8 102.5 
Venezuela 156.9 131.1 145.5 122.0 
Average  87.6 94.2 123.1 114.0 
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3 Central Bank Policies and Macroeconomic Achievements, 1990-2009 
The 1997-98 Asian Crisis was associated to a subsequent recession in LA. Yet the latter 
crisis was also a well-used opportunity in the region, triggering significant changes in policy 
regimes. Many governments and central banks invested in reforms that made their 
economies more resilient to external shocks.5 In fact, the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis 
and recession would be the first test for LA’s new policy regimes, as documented in the 
next section. 
Fiscal positions were strengthened since the early 2000s. Since the start of the 
commodity boom in the mid-2000s, the region’s seven major economies recorded systematic 
fiscal surpluses and their fiscal policy was less pro-cyclical than in the past (Figure 3.1). 
Aggregate public and private-sector prudence during the commodity boom was reflected in 
current-account surpluses and a corresponding improvement in net external asset positions 
(Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.1: Fiscal Balance Ratios to GDP in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
                                                                          
5. Domestic crises in Brazil (1998-99) and Argentina (2001-02) reinforced the policy changes in these countries. 
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Figure 3.2: Net External Asset Ratio to GDP in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
Supported by fiscal adjustment, central banks improved their monetary, ER and 
financial policy framework. Starting from very low levels of international liquidity, many central 
banks built up international reserves through systematic interventions. International reserves 
ratios to GDP doubled in the major economies (Figure 3.3). At the same time, as discussed 
above, a significant number of central banks adopted floating ER regimes (mostly of the 
managed sort), providing them with a price-adjustment mechanism and more monetary policy 
independence, which they lacked under their previous regimes of fixed or intermediate ERs. 
LA is a paramount example of the world’s Great Moderation reflected in attaining low 
inflation and lower volatility of inflation and output. The region’s conquest of inflation 
is reflected in convergence to low single-digit inflation rates in most economies during the 
2000s (Argentina and Venezuela are two exceptions) – a quantum shift from the region’s past 
characterized by perennial high inflation and recurrent hyper-inflation episodes (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.3: International Reserve Ratio to GDP in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
Figure 3.4: Inflation Rate in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
The decline in inflation rates and inflation volatility has been particularly large in IT 
countries. Annual absolute inflation deviations from official target levels exhibit a downward 
trend since the start of IT in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, except for the 2008-09 
largely imported inflation-deflation episode (Figure 3.5). This trend decline in inflation misses 
reflects the growing success of IT central banks in controlling inflation volatility. How does the 
region’s IT success in minimizing inflation deviations from targets compare to IT central banks 
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in other regions? The five countries’ average annual absolute inflation deviation from target 
levels is 2.0%, which is higher than the eight industrial-country IT central banks average 
deviation of 1.3% but lower than the 2.7% average deviation recorded by all other emerging 
economies that have adopted IT (Table 3.1). 
Figure 3.5: Average Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Inflation Targets in 
Latin America (%), from Start of Inflation Targeting to 2009-IV (%) 
 
Note: Inflation deviations are computed as absolute deviations of annual (year-on-year) quarterly inflation 
rates from official inflation targets, from the start of inflation targeting in each country through the last quarter 
of 2009. Country-group averages are computed as simple averages of all countries in each group. 
Source: Schmidt-Hebbel 2010 (b). 
Table 3.1: Average Annual Absolute Inflation Deviations from Inflation Targets in 
Latin America and other Regions, from Start of Inflation Targeting to 2009 (%) 
Brazil 2.95
Chile 1.24
Colombia 1.15
Mexico 3.05
Peru 1.39
  Latin America IT Countries 2.0
  Non-LA IT Emerging Economies 2.7
  IT Industrial Countries 1.3
 
Note: Country average absolute inflation deviations are computed as absolute deviations of annual (year-
on-year) quarterly inflation rates from official inflation targets, averaged from the start of inflation targeting 
in each country through the last quarter of 2009. Country-group averages are computed as simple 
averages of all countries in each group. 
Source: Schmidt-Hebbel 2010 (b). 
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The major economies in LA exhibit rising trend growth since the Asian crisis, 
only interrupted by the recession in the wake of the 2008-09 Global Crisis (Figure 3.6). 
The output gap behaves accordingly (Figure 3.7). Output stability, measured by rolling 
standard deviations of quarterly growth rates, suggests a trend rise in stability (a decline in 
standard deviations) in the five IT countries since the Asian Crisis, again except for the 
2008-09 global crisis episode (Figure 3.8). 
Figure 3.6: GDP Growth Rate in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
 Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
Figure 3.7: Output Gap in Latin America, 1990-2009 (%) 
 
Note: 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
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All the latter evidence is based on unconditional performance measures. Controlling 
for shocks and the influence of other factors that drive the behavior of inflation and output, 
how did LA and its central banks perform during the last decade? I address this question 
in two steps. Here I focus on conditional monetary policy efficiency in IT countries. In the 
following section I refer to the role of central bank policies in dampening the effects of 
the Global Crisis on output. 
Gauging monetary policy efficiency involves measuring inflation and output 
volatility, consistent with a monetary policy objective function that minimizes the latter volatility 
measures. In the absence of cross-country measures of monetary policy efficiency for a 
sample of Latin American economies, here I refer to evidence for all IT countries in the 
world and for Chile, based on a common methodology.6 Figure 3.9 depicts efficiency frontiers 
and observed inflation and output volatility in IT countries before they adopted IT and in 
stationary-target IT countries. Smaller supply shocks after the mid-1990s are reflected 
by the inward shift in the efficiency frontier. A very significant increase in monetary policy 
efficiency attained by stationary-target IT countries is reflected by the closeness of the 
point of observed volatilities to the corresponding frontier, in comparison to pre-IT positions. 
Figure 3.8: Output Stability in Latin America, 1990-2009 
 
Note: output stability is measured as eight-quarter rolling standard deviation of annualized quarterly GDP 
growth rates through the corresponding quarter indicated in the figure. 5 LA: average for Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 7 LA: average for 5 LA, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
Source: based on data reported in Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
                                                                          
6. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), following Cecchetti et al. (2006), solve for the minimization problem of a 
central-bank loss function based on inflation and output volatility, subject to a highly stylized structure of an economy 
reflected by aggregate demand and supply equations. Extending the previous empirical work by Cecchetti et al. (2006) 
applied to individual countries, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel estimate the system of equations on panel data for different 
treatment (IT) country groups and different control (non-IT) country groups, based on quarterly data for 1989-2004. 
Using the parameter estimates and the model solution, they construct inflation-output variability frontiers that represent 
measures of economic performance and monetary policy efficiency. Supply shock variability is interpreted as a change in 
the position of the efficiency frontier while the efficiency of monetary policy is measured by the distance from the 
economy’s observed volatility performance to the policy efficiency frontier. 
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Figure 3.9: Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Inflation and Output Volatility in IT 
Countries before IT Adoption and in Stationary-Target IT Countries (%) 
 
Source: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008). 
A similar improvement in monetary policy efficiency is observed in Chile’s experience 
(Figure 3.10). Here the comparison is between 1991-2000 – a decade of partial IT and 
converging inflation targets – and 2000-2006 – a period of full-fledged IT and stationary inflation 
target. Similar to the experience of all other IT countries, observed inflation and output volatility 
declined strongly and monetary policy efficiency improved significantly under stationary IT. 
Figure 3.10: Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Inflation and Output Volatility in Chile  
during Converging IT (1991-1999) and Stationary IT (2000-2006) (%) 
 
Source: Corbo (2007). 
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4 Central Banks’ Response to the Global Crisis, 2008-2009 
How did central banks in LA respond to the Global Financial Crisis and its recessionary 
consequences? What was their contribution in reducing the amplitude of the 2008-09 
recession – and how does it compare to 1998-99? I address these questions in the following. 
4.1 LA central bank measures in response to the crisis 
Most central banks were much better prepared to face a global crisis in 2008 than they 
were a decade before. As described above, they had invested heavily in improving 
their ER, monetary, and financial policy regimes. Therefore the region’s fiscal, external, 
monetary, and financial conditions were much stronger when the Global Financial Crisis hit 
in September 2008 than at any previous experience of world shocks. Yet the intensity of 
the financial crisis in the world’s financial centers and the magnitude of the subsequent 
world recession took LA’s central banks (like those in other regions) by surprise, requiring 
a quick and effective policy response. 
Several LA governments adopted strong counter-cyclical (expansionary) fiscal policy 
measures in response to the crisis, complementing and facilitating the response of central 
banks. Depending on the country and its ER regime, central banks used a combination 
of foreign-exchange provision (i.e., ER intervention) and ER depreciation to cushion the 
exchange market pressures caused by the global crisis. Among the foreign-exchange 
operations carried out by many central banks (including all five inflation targeters) between 
September 2008 and mid-2009 were some of the following: currency swaps, foreign 
exchange swap auctions, direct foreign exchange spot purchases, and foreign currency 
term liquidity provisions. In addition, some countries agreed foreign exchange swap with 
foreign central banks  (Brazil, Mexico) and signed up for an IMF Contingent Credit Line and/or 
an IMF Special Drawing Right facility (Colombia, Mexico).7 
Most LA central banks engaged in conventional monetary policy easing (Figure 4.1). 
Some central banks lowered their interest rates quickly and aggressively in late 2008 
and early 2009, as many industrial-country central banks did at that time. In LA, however, 
only Chile lowered rates close to the zero lower bound. All LA central banks (other than 
Chile’s) lowered policy rates to minimum levels that were well above zero, which is consistent 
with the fact that their complementary unconventional policies of quantitative liquidity and 
credit easing were much less extensive than those pursued in many industrial countries. 
In addition, LA’s local financial markets did not dry up and domestic financial institutions 
were not at the brink of bankruptcy, as was the case in several industrial countries. 
                                                                          
7. Calani et al. (2010) provide a valuable description of different forms of ER interventions and conventional/ 
unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by 9 industrial and emerging countries with IT regimes in response to 
the global crisis in 2008-09. They also document quantitatively the significant deviations of monetary policy decisions 
from the prescriptions based on standard monetary policy functions during the crisis, as well as the impact of ER 
interventions and unconventional quantitative measures on domestic interest rates and exchange rates, reporting mixed 
results. 
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Figure 4.1: Monetary Policy Rate in Inflation-Targeting Countries, 2008-2009 
 
Source: National Central Bank websites. 
The range of unconventional policies aimed at providing liquidity and reducing risk 
premiums, adopted by LA’s central banks in IT countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Peru) and elsewhere, spans the following instruments: 
(i) Reduction of bank reserve requirements, 
(ii) Pre-commitment to hold on to low policy rates for a period well beyond the next 
monetary policy meeting, 
(iii) Implementation of term liquidity facilities (typically for 3-6 month maturity) at the 
current low monetary policy rate, 
(iv) Expanded purchase of central bank liabilities, 
(v) Extension of domestic interest swap lines, 
(vi) Purchase of private-sector liabilities, relaxing collateral requirements, and 
(vii) Purchase of treasury bonds. 
Some evidence suggests that the unconventional monetary programs were 
successful in reducing domestic interest rates, flattening yield curves, reducing risk premiums 
in domestic asset markets, lowering bank lending-deposit rate spreads, and providing 
liquidity [Central Bank of Chile (2009), Calani et al. (2010), Céspedes et al.( 2010)]. Therefore 
one may conclude tentatively that the latter unconventional policies by LA central banks 
were complementary to interest-rate cuts in supporting private credit provision by commercial 
banks and hence in dampening the impact of the global crisis on domestic aggregate 
demand and output. 
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Finally, LA central bank responses to the crisis – like those by industrial-country 
central banks – largely satisfied Noyer’s (2009) three desirable characteristics of crisis 
interventions: they were fast and decisive, flexible and highly innovative, and cooperative 
and convergent. 
LA’s commercial banks entered largely the crisis with strong financial positions. 
There were no U.S. toxic assets and few derivatives on their balance sheets. Yet at different 
points in time between September and December 2009, foreign credit lines to banks and 
non-financial institutions in LA were in part curtailed, in response to higher sovereign risk or 
lack of available liquidity in foreign creditor banks. The central banks’ ER interventions and 
foreign-currency credit lines, and their provision of domestic liquidity and credit lines to 
commercial banks, substituted for the reduction in foreign credit. 
In sum, bank credit to the private sector was not curtailed in 2008-09, which 
contributed to lessen the recessionary impact of the crisis. For the first time in many decades, 
LA’s banking systems faced successfully a major external shock without suffering turbulence 
or a crisis, supported by effective risk control and high bank capitalization, as shown above. 
4.2 Contribution of central bank policies to lessen the 2008-2009 recession 
How much did the investments made by the region’s central banks in improving their policy 
framework during the last decade and the measures they took in response to the unfolding 
world crisis cushion their economies from the recession? Controlling for the direct effects 
of the world recession, how much did central bank policies contribute to lessen the 2008-09 
recession – and how did their performance compare to the policy response during the 
1998-99 recession in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis? 
Here I respond to the latter questions, referring to recent empirical results from 
joint research conducted with Vittorio Corbo [Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010)]. In the latter 
work, we specify and estimate an empirical growth model for the seven largest LA economies 
that encompasses a large set of structural, institutional, policy, and cyclical determinants 
of short and long-term growth, anchored in theory and international evidence.8 Here 
I summarize briefly how we put the latter regression results at work, by identifying the role of 
international and domestic growth determinants – including central bank policies – of the 
amplitude of LA’s recessions in the wake of the Asian Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis. 
                                                                          
8. We use a database comprised by an unbalanced panel of quarterly 1990.1 – 1999.4 data for the LA-7 country 
sample, comprised by the five IT countries – Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru – plus Argentina and Venezuela. 
Estimations are preformed using the multi-variate fixed-effects unbalanced panel estimator. 
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Table 4.1: Amplitude of GDP Growth Decline in Latin America, 1998-1999 and  
2008-2009 
 
Note: Cumulative GDP growth rates within the reference period. 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
Table 4.1 reports the annualized recession amplitudes for the seven individual 
countries and the region at large during both recessions. The peak-to-trough cumulative 
GDP change ranges from a GDP loss of 8.5% in Venezuela to a GDP gain of 3.4% in Mexico 
during the four-quarter 1998-99 recession. In contrast to the 1998-99 case, all seven 
countries are in negative terrain during the three-quarter 2008-09 recession, with cumulative 
GDP losses that range from 0.9% in Colombia to 11.1% in Mexico. Simple (weighted) country 
averages of recession amplitudes for the region stand at -3.0% (-1.2%) for the first recession 
and -4.2% (-5.2%) for the second recession. By any of the latter measures, it is clear that the 
second recession was much deeper than the first one. 
Table 4.2 reports a decomposition of the region’s observed simple-average 
recession amplitude for 1998-99 and 2008-09, making use of the regression coefficient 
estimates and the changes in independent variables (and in coefficient estimates, when 
applicable).9 A summary of the latter decomposition, according to key sets of explanatory 
variables, is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
                                                                          
9. Table 4.2 reports the recession amplitude decomposition for the Asian crisis (column 1) and for the global financial 
crisis (column 2). The latter column is divided into three parts: the first is based on changes in explanatory variables only, 
the second is based on changes in estimated parameters only, and the third is the total contribution, which is the sum 
of the two previous parts. 
 Asian Crisis Global Financial Crisis 
 1998 Q3–1999 Q2 2008 Q4–2009 Q2 
Argentina -5.20% -1.55% 
Brazil -1.03% -3.99% 
Chile -3.88% -4.40% 
Colombia -6.82% -0.87% 
Mexico 3.37% -11.09% 
Peru 1.15% -3.64% 
Venezuela -8.51% -3.59% 
Simple Average -2.99% -4.16% 
Weighted Average -1.15% -5.24% 
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Table 4.2: Decomposition of Latin America’s Recessions, 1998-1999 and 2008-2009 
 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
 Asian Crisis Global Financial Crisis 
 1998 Q3–
1999 Q2 
2008 Q4–
2009 Q2 
Amplitude of GDP Growth Decline -2.99% -4.16% 
 Structural Changes 
 NO Changes YES 
Sources:  
Long-Term Variables -1.68% 0.77%  0.05% 
Private Credit 0.24% 0.44% 0.44% 
Inflation 0.65% 0.97% -0.73% 0.24% 
Secondary School Enrollment -0.14% 0.15% 0.15% 
Fiscal Balance -1.17% -0.73% -0.73% 
Political Certainty -1.26% -0.06% 0.01% -0.05% 
     
Structural Variables -0.57% 0.59%  -1.70% 
Financial Openness 0.73% -0.60% 0.14% -0.46% 
Trade Openness -0.53% -1.32% -0.79% -2.11% 
Net External Assets -0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 
International Reserves -0.68% 2.43% -1.64% 0.79% 
Exchanges Rate Regime -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
  
Foreign Cyclical Variables 0.54% -2.60%  -2.74% 
Terms of Trade Growth 0.02% -0.32% -0.32% 
Growth of Trading Partners 0.26% -1.36% -1.36% 
Growth of World Exports 0.53% -0.05% -0.05% 
Capital Inflows to Latin America -0.05% -0.68% -0.68% 
Sovereing Spreads -0.22% -0.19% -0.14% -0.33% 
  
Domestic Policy Variables -0.99% -0.14%  0.99% 
Government Consumption 0.69% 1.12% 1.12% 
Real Interest Rate -1.68% -1.26% 1.13% -0.13% 
  
Interactions -0.02% -0.67%  -0.67% 
Government of Trading Partners * Trade Openness 0.00% -0.19% -0.19% 
Government of Trading Partners * Financial Openness 0.10% -0.35% -0.35% 
Capital Inflows to Latin America *  Financial Openness -0.09% -0.10% -0.10% 
Sovereign Spreads * Net External Assets -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% 
  
Structural Changes post-2000  -2.02%   
Explained variation -2.72% -4.07% -4.07% 
Unexplained variation -0.26% -0.09% 0.09% 
Total Variation -2.99% -4.16% -4.16% 
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Figure 4.2: Contribution of Groups of Growth Determinants to Latin America’s 
Recessions, 1998-1999 and 2008-2009 
 
Source: Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010). 
The amplitude of the first recession is -3.0% (reported in the bottom line of 
Table 4.2), of which some 90% (i.e., an annualized output decline of 2.7%) is explained by 
the contribution of growth factors. Of the much deeper second recession, with an amplitude 
of -4.2%, some 95% (i.e., an annualized output decline of 4.1%) is explained by growth 
determinants. What are the factors driving the growth decline – and which roles did policies 
play in the downturns? 
A first striking difference emerges between both recessions. On average (across 
countries and across the five foreign cyclical variables), international conditions improved 
during the first recession, contributing by 0.5% to higher cumulative growth. The opposite 
is observed during the recent recession, when international conditions deteriorated on 
average massively for LA, contributing by -2.7% to (or more than half of) the recession’s 
amplitude. While the 1998-99 recession was largely home-made, the 2008-09 recession was 
largely imported to the region. 
Second, trade and financial openness spur long-term growth – but larger integration 
into the world economy deepens recessions when world trade declines and capital inflows 
turn into outflows. This was an important recession factor in 2008-09, in contrast to 1998-99 
when LA was less open and not affected by a deteriorating world economy. 
Third, political credibility deterioration contributed significantly to the 1998-99 
recession, while it did not change in 2008-09, reflecting higher and more resilient levels of 
confidence in the region’s politics and economics. 
Fourth, fiscal policy contraction deepened the 1998-99 recession, while fiscal 
expansion helped to offset part of the 2008-09 recession. 
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Now I turn to the role of central bank policies. In both recessions inflation fell and this 
decline (as a proxy of macroeconomic stability) had a positive (dampening) effect on output 
in both downturns. The regime change from fixed or intermediate to flexible ER regimes 
during the last decade had two positive effects on growth. First, a flexible ER regime has 
a direct positive effect on long-term growth (not reflected in the short-term recession 
decomposition in Table 4.2). Second, ER flexibility does not require active ER defense 
through monetary policy. While policy interest rates were raised by several central banks in 
1998 to defend their fixed ERs, policy rates were actively (and, in some countries, 
aggressively) reduced in 2008-09. As a result of strongly declining inflation rates – in some 
countries, from high positive to negative levels – real policy rates rose during the 2008-09 
recession, but less than in 1998-99. All in all, the direct effect of real policy rates was very 
negative for growth in 1998-99, while it was close to nil in 2008-09. As a result of the region’s 
stable financial system that provided continued private-sector access to credit, and also 
due to lower nominal interest rates, bank credit to the private sector expanded in 2008-09 at 
twice the speed of 1998-99, lessening the recession. Finally, central banks’ low and declining 
levels of international reserves – as part of non-flexible ER regimes – deepened the 1998-99 
recession, while high and rising reserve holdings lessened the 2008-09 recession. 
I conclude that LA’s central bank policies have changed significantly during the 
last decade, as a result of a new policy framework based on monetary policy focused on low 
and stable inflation (often supported by full-fledged IT), a flexible ER regime combined 
with significant international reserve buffers, and adoption (in conjunction with governments) 
of prudent financial regulation in support of a stable domestic banking system and strong 
international financial integration. This policy framework has served LA’s central banks well in 
responding to the crisis and dampening its domestic recessionary impact. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1102 
5 The Road Ahead: Post-crisis Policy Challenges faced by Central Banks in Latin 
America 
Having weathered well the global financial crisis and recession, now LA’s central banks 
face a large array of policy challenges. Some are faced by central banks in industrial and 
emerging economies alike, derived from the crisis itself and the issues it poses for improving 
the role of central banks in attaining more effectively both monetary and financial stability. 
Other challenges are idiosyncratic to emerging economies in LA (and elsewhere) that are 
facing a strong recovery, high output and demand growth, high commodity prices, large 
capital inflows, booming domestic asset and real-estate markets, and real ER appreciation. 
Moreover, central bank policy challenges are conditional to other public policies, particularly 
fiscal policy [Uribe (2009)]. Hence I focus on the three latter issues next. 
5.1 Policy Challenges faced by Central Banks – both in Latin America and 
elsewhere 
The global crisis and recession has revealed weaknesses of central bank policy frameworks 
that were hidden by the Great Moderation and the boom years that preceded the crisis. 
In addition, a host of new issues, related to financial stability and its relation to monetary 
stability, have been forwarded by the global financial crisis. A selective discussion of these 
issues follows, with a focus on the challenges they imply for central banks in LA. 
5.1.1 WORLD-WIDE REFORM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 
Central  banks  world-wide  are  engaged  with  governments and international organizations 
– including the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, the IMF, and the BIS – in reaching a better 
understanding of the multi-dimensional causes of the crisis and, subsequently, to agree 
on a common framework for reform of financial supervision and regulation. The first task is 
intellectually challenging and the second is politically difficult. Detailed explanations of the 
crisis and reform proposals are put forward by central bank governors, including  Carstens 
(2010), De Gregorio (2009, 2010a, 2010b), Fernández Ordóñez (2009a, 2009b), Noyer (2009, 
2010), Orphanides (2009, 2010), Trichet (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), Uribe (2009a, 2010), and 
Weber (2010a, 2010b, 2010c).10 
Both tasks require to be addressed with a strong sense of urgency, in order to 
preclude a repeat of this crisis, which could be significantly worse than the previous crisis 
due to the massive moral hazard introduced by the (well-justified) financial-sector rescue 
programs. While there is some consensus on the main market and policy failures that led 
to the financial crisis and the broad features of required reforms, there is still significant 
disagreement on detailed design and implementation features of the reforms. 
In this international context, which are the key tasks for LA’s central banks? First, 
active participation of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in G-20 and FSB meetings of discussion, 
negotiation, and approval of financial reform proposals. Second, engaged and independent 
evaluation of analytical underpinnings, empirical effects, and policy implications of reform 
                                                                          
10. My favorite list of the dozen key market and policy failures that led to the financial crisis is the following dozen:  
disaster myopia, moral hazard, agency problem, flawed risk models, reliance on banks’ proprietary models, reliance on 
risk-rating agencies, complexity, blindness to systemic risks, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, no coherent 
rescue procedures, supervision failures, and regulatory arbitrage [Corbo et al. (2011)]. 
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proposals by all central banks and their research departments. Finally, careful but committed 
implementation of financial reforms that are agreed internationally. 
5.1.2 MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
A key area of financial reform for central banks is macro-prudential regulation because it 
will both be the single most important instrument for aiming at systemic financial stability 
and fall squarely on the lap of central banks. While still under discussion, but inspired 
by Spain’s successful experience, macro-prudential regulation will complement standard 
micro-prudential regulation and oversight by putting in place a combination of dynamic 
(cyclical) liquidity and capital provisions that offset the pro-cyclical interconnections between 
asset valuation, credit flows, and leverage [Fernández Ordóñez (2009a)]. 
The challenge for LA’s central banks will be similar to that discussed above: 
participating actively in discussing the final shape and implementation of macro-prudential 
regulation, understanding well its empirical and policy implications, and adopting it effectively 
and quickly, following Colombia’s lead in the region. 
5.1.3 FLEXIBLE IT11 
Flexible IT, conducted transparently by an independent central bank and combined with a 
floating ER, defined the international frontier of best-practice monetary and ER regimes before 
the crisis. Is this still the case? Two years ago, a Nobel prize recipient predicted the demise 
of IT due to its presumed failures that supposedly led to the financial crisis [Stiglitz (2008)]. 
Yet this monetary regime survived the crisis unscathed – relative to other competing 
monetary regimes – and therefore IT central banks world-wide do not seem inclined to ditch 
this regime. 
However there are several challenges to standard IT as it is practiced today. Here 
I refer to two sets of challenges that lie ahead for IT central banks. The first relates 
to demands for enlarging monetary policy transparency. The second set is comprised by 
systemic challenges to the conduct of policy and the design of IT that are derived from 
questions posed by the monetary policy experience of the 2002-2009 boom-bust cycle 
[for more discussion see Hammond (2009) and Walsh (2009a, 2009b). 
The evidence discussed in this and other papers on the comparative achievements 
of monetary policy under IT suggests that explicit IT delivers at least similar results of 
stabilization than those observed in other successful monetary regimes (including implicit IT 
and other monetary regimes different from explicit IT, like those pursued by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan). In three particular dimensions 
IT may dominate alternative regimes. First, IT is associated to higher levels of transparency 
and accountability than those observed in other regimes, as shown by Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007) and Geraats (2008). IT may also provide more predictability because 
of less discretion in monetary policy decisions [Walsh (2009a, 2009b)]. Third, IT delivers 
better anchoring of inflation expectations [Gürkaynak et al. (2007) and De Carvalho and 
Minella (2009)]. However, overall macroeconomic stability (measured by inflation and volatility 
of inflation and output) and monetary policy efficiency are not found to be higher in IT 
countries than in major industrial economies that have in place other monetary regimes, 
                                                                          
11. Here I follow closely previous discussions on challenges for inflation targeting [Walsh (2009a, 2009b), 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2010b)]. 
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like the U.S., the euro zone, and Japan [Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), among others, 
as discussed by Walsh (2009a)]. 
Most IT central banks still face important transparency and communication 
challenges. First, following the advice of academics and the encouraging experience of 
several IT central banks that already have done so, all ITers should aim at publishing their 
interest-rate forecasts and fan charts, complementing their current publication of inflation and 
output growth forecasts and fan charts. Second, to extend transparency of their projections, 
central banks should include their backcasts and forecasts of key unobservable variables 
[Schmidt-Hebbel and Walsh (2009)], including potential or efficient-level output (and the 
output gap), the natural unemployment rate (and the deviation of the actual from the natural 
rate of unemployment), the neutral rate of interest (and the interest-rate gap), and the 
equilibrium exchange rate (and the deviation of the actual from the equilibrium exchange rate). 
Finally, while central banks have made improvements in procedural transparency, they should 
commit to publish timely and full transcripts or minutes of their monetary policy meetings. 
Frontier monetary policy – under both IT and other inflation regimes – is severely 
challenged by our current understanding of the current financial crisis cum recession and 
the boom-and-bubble period that preceded it. This raises two sets of issues for monetary 
policy and monetary regime choice: the role of asset prices and financial frictions for 
monetary policy in general (not just under IT) and the design of IT. 
The pre-crisis consensus view on the role of asset prices and monetary policy 
was that the latter should react to asset-price shocks only to the extent that they affect 
inflation forecasts or if the real interest rate were affected by financial shocks [Bernanke and 
Gertler (2001)]. Yet financial frictions (like real frictions) affect monetary policy transmission 
and interact with nominal rigidities, hence calling for monetary policy to mitigate the 
effects of the latter interaction.12 The crisis has highlighted the latter role for monetary 
policy [as shown in recent theoretical work by Cúrdia and Woodford (2008), De Fiore 
and Tristani (2009), and Demirel (2009)] although, as pointed out by Walsh (2009b), 
the appropriate monetary policy response will depend on the type of financial friction and 
shock. 
A separate, much longer discussion has been whether central banks should 
lean against the wind of asset-price bubbles. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Cecchetti el al. (2002), 
and Borio and White (2003) have argued that monetary policy should attempt burst bubbles 
ex ante. Against the latter, the wide-shared consensus view was that monetary policy 
was too ineffective to deal with bubbles, that bubbles were difficult to identify ex ante, and 
that the more effective alternative would be to address the effects of a busting bubble 
by easing policy after the fact [Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Bernanke (2002), Gertler (2003)]. 
The latter consensus view has been seriously shattered by the massive real costs 
and deflationary consequences of the housing and equity price bursts observed in many 
industrial economies, with world-wide consequences. While this bubble-and-bust experience 
has also certainly other causes in many market and regulatory imperfections that require 
                                                                          
12. Walsh (2009a) makes the important point that monetary policy acts as second-best policy. If an effective 
time-varying fiscal-policy instrument (based on taxes and subsidies) were available to counter-act the effects of mark-up 
(real) shocks, monetary policy would not be necessary to mitigate the inflation and output effects of interactions between 
real frictions and nominal rigidities. In the same vein, if an effective time-varying financial regulation (for example, 
counter-cyclical capital and liquidity requirements) were available to counter-act the effects of financial shocks, 
like changes in credit spreads, monetary would not be necessary to mitigate the consequences of interactions between 
financial frictions and nominal rigidities. 
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separate  regulatory  reform, it  is  likely to lead to changes in the conduct of monetary policy 
– both with and without IT – aiming at deflating incipient asset-price bubbles. 
Another issue brought to the forefront by monetary policy actions during the current 
crisis is to come to a better theoretical and practical understanding of how conventional 
monetary policy – both under IT and other monetary regimes – is complemented by the type 
of unconventional monetary (and credit) policies that were discussed above. 
Finally, the crisis has brought to the open the problems faced by monetary policy 
under conditions of severe deflationary demand shock that leads to policy rate cuts toward 
zero, i.e., when the zero-lower bound (ZLB) is binding. Three design corrections to the actual 
implementation of IT in most countries could reduce the likelihood of attaining the ZLB: raising 
the numerical inflation target (at the cost of having higher average inflation), adopting a 
core-inflation target, which exhibits less volatility around the central target value than headline 
inflation (at the cost of reducing the usefulness and credibility of a headline-inflation target), 
and extending the standard policy horizons under IT (typically between 2 and 3 years) 
to 5 years or more, as suggested by Mishkin (2008). The three latter alternatives have been 
discussed in the literature on the start and optimal design of IT. They were largely dismissed 
until now but the binding ZLB and the protracted recession make their discussion relevant 
again. I find the latter three options unconvincing, while my sympathy lies with the following 
option. 
The most radical challenge to IT comes from the proposal of adopting price level 
targeting (PLT). Long before the current crisis, Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) were 
among the first to evaluate seriously the relative merits and possible adoption of PLT. PLT’s 
main theoretical advantage over IT is that the expectation that prices will return to their target 
level influences current inflation when price setting is forward-looking. This benefit may be 
strong when the ZLB holds and the economy is in a deflationary liquidity trap. Deflation 
bygones under IT are not bygones under PLT, requiring future inflation that is on average 
higher than the inflation target level (or the price level target trend). As this is anticipated 
by forward-looking agents, the likelihood of getting into a deflationary situation is lower 
under PLT and, when it materializes, the likelihood of getting out more quickly is larger under 
PLT.13 Although much more analysis and simulation studies are required [see Walsh (2009a) 
and Weber (2010a)], PLT  is likely to emerge as a viable and possibly  superior  alternative  to 
– or improvement of – IT in the future. 
5.2 Idiosyncratic policy challenges faced by Latin America’s central banks 
As opposed to industrial countries, but similar to other emerging-economy regions, 
LA is facing a strong recovery, high output and demand growth, high commodity prices, large 
capital inflows, booming domestic asset and real-estate markets, and real ER appreciation. 
This poses severe strains on policy makers in general and central banks in particular. 
I discuss three policy challenges faced by the region’s central banks today. 
5.2.1 LA’S LARGE SENSITIVITY TO FOREIGN SHOCKS 
LA is a very open region and therefore sensitive to foreign shocks. Cross-country research 
shows that sensitivity to shocks is exacerbated in LA by weaker institutions, less domestic 
                                                                          
13. Walsh (2009b) reports counter-factual simulation results of the stabilizing effects of PLT on inflation expectations, 
if the U.S. had had PLT in place at the start of the crisis instead of its actual monetary regime. 
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financial development, and lower financial integration than in industrial countries [Calderón 
et al. (2008), Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008)]. 
The policy implication of the latter for LA is to attach a high priority to strengthen 
counter-cyclicality of all its macro policies – fiscal, monetary, and macro-prudential policies – 
to offset more effectively the destabilizing effects of external shocks. 
5.2.2 COMMODITY BOOMS 
One major source of foreign shocks are commodity price booms and busts. A long-lasting 
commodity boom started in 2006, briefly interrupted by the global crisis but going ahead 
with invigorated intensity, driven by high growth in emerging economies and Asian growth 
in particular. Many analysts predict that commodity prices could remain at very high levels for 
several years. This poses significant dilemmas for policy makers of commodity-exporting 
countries. Certainly the first-best policy to deal with a commodity boom is to save 
the estimated temporary component of commodity prices. This can be supported by 
counter-cyclical monetary, fiscal, and macro-prudential policies, with governments saving 
their part of temporary commodity revenue in sovereign wealth funds. 
5.2.3 REAL ER APPRECIATION AND ER INTERVENTIONS 
A large real ER appreciation has been observed in LA since the start of the post-crisis 
recovery in mid-2009, fuelled by high growth, booming commodity prices, and large capital 
inflows.14 Significant ER interventions have been conducted by many LA central banks 
for the reasons discussed above, before, during, and after the crisis. Yet after the return to 
normal times, the question arises about the pros and cons of systematic and of sporadic ER 
interventions. As discussed above, interventions could be considered second-best policy 
options, potentially useful in the absence of first-best responses to the underlying shocks 
(higher commodity prices, larger capital inflows), such as effective counter-cyclical policies 
and effective financial regulation and supervision. Finally, if exceptional ER interventions are 
implemented, Chile’s experience of pre-announced intervention periods and amounts could 
be an example of effective interventions in response to sporadic ER bubbles. 
5.2.4 LARGE (GROSS) CAPITAL INFLOWS AND CAPITAL CONTROLS 
LA is facing again a period of large gross capital inflows, caused by search for higher portfolio 
returns, high domestic growth and improved investment opportunities, and lower country risk. 
As in previous episodes of large capital inflows, they may contribute to excessive debt 
accumulation, domestic overheating, and real ER overvaluation. A related risk is that investor 
sentiment about investment opportunities and risks may change abruptly, causing a sudden 
reversal in capital inflows, triggering a possible financial crisis and recession. To preclude 
such risks, two Latin America countries (Brazil and Colombia) have already imposed controls 
on capital inflows and others may follow. 
As discussed above, the evidence on effectiveness and costs of capital controls is 
generally not supportive of their use. Capital controls could only be justified as an exceptional 
second-best policy when first-best solutions are not available and when the stabilizing 
effects of capital controls outweigh the costs derived from the financial distortions caused 
by controls. When first best policies are feasible to implement, they should be tried first: 
                                                                          
14. However, the U.S. dollar depreciation against most other currencies in the world implies that bilateral real ERs 
(against the U.S. dollar) have appreciated much more than multilateral real (or real effective) ERs in the region. 
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strong counter-cyclical macroeconomic and macro-prudential policies, and enhanced 
regulation of domestic financial systems to stem accumulation of currency, maturity, and 
sector credit risks that may be exacerbated by large capital inflows. Not surprisingly, 
as countries develop financially and economically, controls on capital inflows are abolished 
completely and permanently. 
5.3 Fiscal Policy Challenges 
Central bank policies are ineffective in the absence of prudent and sustainable fiscal policy 
[Uribe (2009a, 2009b)]. Moreover, central banks’ conventional counter-cyclical monetary 
policy, future counter-cyclical macro-prudential policy, and financial stability policy are all 
strengthened by governments that adopt effective sustainable and counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies. For this reason I end this section referring to the need of deep reforms in the region’s 
fiscal frameworks. 
Latin America has made significant progress in fiscal consolidation over the last 
two decades, as documented in section 2. Indeed, current measures of fiscal deficits 
and debt levels put most LA economies at a far distance from the dismal fiscal position 
observed in many industrial countries today – a complete reversal of fortunes compared 
to two decades ago. 
However, Latin America’s fiscal stance and performance is still fragile and very 
sensitive to major shocks, exhibiting pro-cyclicality, lacking fiscal rules (except Chile), 
and lacking a sound institutional set-up. The way forward is conceptually straightforward 
but politically fraught with difficulties: turning fiscal policy pro-cyclicality into counter-cyclicality, 
adopting fiscal rules based on cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance targets (like in Chile since 
2001), and putting in place fiscal councils, i.e., independent institutions that monitor 
budgetary planning and execution according to the fiscal rule and conduct technical 
assessment of fiscal, financial, and macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy changes 
(like the councils proposed in France and the United Kingdom). 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
In this lecture I have reviewed the profound changes and significant achievements of central 
banks in LA during the last two decades, discussing also their main challenges faced in the 
post-crisis world. 
LA’s central banks were strengthened in the 1990s by independence laws, adoption 
of new policy regimes (foremost inflation targeting), and more transparent policy decisions 
bound by ex-ante rules and ex-post accountability. Central bank modernization – supported 
by significant fiscal adjustment and financial-sector strengthening – led most Latin American 
countries to converge to one-digit inflation rates and contributed to higher and more stable 
growth than in the past. 
Yet the region’s new policy framework was put to severe testing by the global 
financial crisis. Quick and innovative policy responses by the region’s central banks helped 
domestic financial systems and the real economy to resist well the massive financial and real 
consequences of the banking crisis and recession in industrial countries. I have reported 
empirical evidence that shows that the central banks’ new policy framework and policy 
response during the crisis dampened significantly the amplitude of the recession. 
Having weathered well the global financial crisis and recession, now Latin America’s 
central banks face a large array of policy challenges, which are reviewed in this lecture. 
Some are common to central banks in industrial and emerging economies, derived from 
the crisis itself and the issues it poses for improving the role of central banks in attaining 
more effectively both monetary and financial stability. The latter imply that the region’s 
central banks should take active part in the global discussion and adoption of reforms 
of financial regulation and supervision and adoption of a new macro-prudential policy 
framework. Furthermore, IT adoption should be extended through the region and its 
implementation should be improved. 
Other challenges are idiosyncratic to emerging economies in LA (and elsewhere) 
that are facing renewed growth, high commodity prices, large capital inflows, and significant 
real exchange-rate appreciation. The latter challenges are addressed best by strengthening 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic and macro-prudential policies, and enhancing regulation 
of domestic financial systems to stem accumulation of currency, maturity, and credit risks 
that may be exacerbated by large capital inflows. The region’s progress in attaining the 
latter policy objectives will determine the pace at which LA’s central banks graduate from 
second-best policy options like exchange-rate interventions and capital controls. 
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Discussion by Agustin Carstens, Governor Banco de Mexico 
Thank you very much. I would like to thank Governor Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, 
Javier Aríztegui and the organizers for having us here and, especially, for giving me the 
opportunity to comment on the paper presented by Klaus. As always, Klaus has written 
a superb paper. He really has captured the essence of something I consider one of the 
most successful economic phenomena in decades in Latin America, which is, precisely, 
the process of controlling inflation in this region through institutional building. 
I would venture to say that Klaus, José de Gregorio, José Darío, and myself are 
part of the “crises generation”. Back at the time when we were students, we would be going 
from one crisis to another. And the only thing we learnt in school was how to deal with 
different crises. After three decades, and since we are not young any longer, I believe 
we have learnt a lesson. And not only us, but society in general in Latin America, has learnt 
a lesson. I think that in most Latin American countries there is now a very strong social 
consensus about the importance of good policymaking and good macro-policymaking, 
with absolute respect and understanding of the importance of central bank independence. 
I would like to give the example of Mexico. Last year, as Klaus showed, we went into a 
very deep recession. Even then, we were one of the very few countries, if not the only one, 
to make a fiscal adjustment. We increased the value added tax, the income tax, and other 
excise taxes. And it was worthwhile because now we are reaping the benefits of it. 
This year, just a few months ago, when the government presented the 2011 budget, 
the main opposition party wanted to reduce the value added tax. There was uproar in society, 
with sectors of public opinion claiming that a lower VAT was a bad idea. This just shows 
how society changes as a result of persistent crises. 
During the last half of the 20th century, Latin America had several lost decades in 
economic terms, and this experience is what has driven the current social and political 
response. But a key point, and I believe Klaus develops this idea very nicely in his paper, 
is that a cornerstone in such process has been institutional building in central banking: 
giving the central bank a clear, transparent mandate and operational independence, 
with the instruments to achieve such mandate. The benefit of granting autonomy to the 
central bank comes not only from having an entity in the state fully devoted to pursue price 
stability, but also due to the discipline it induces on other macro-policies, mostly fiscal policy. 
Our governments do not have a loose budget constraint any longer, thus they have become 
more fiscally responsible. The institutional building exercise has therefore been very powerful, 
with very forceful externalities in other public policies areas as well. 
Reading Klaus´s paper and discussing it here at Banco de España brought back 
fond memories. In the early nineties, when Banco de México embarked on moving both to an 
inflation targeting scheme and an independent central bank, we received a lot of technical 
support from Banco de España. I remember the discussions with José Luis Malo de Molina 
and José Viñals, because at that time, Banco de España was one of the pioneers of inflation 
targeting. Another coincidence is that our independence law was pretty much modeled 
after that of Banco Central de Chile. It was real fun reading the retrospective about all of these 
issues, written by one of the top Chilean economists. 
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I must say that it is very difficult to make comments on Klaus’ papers because they 
are always so complete and enlightening. Rather than criticizing, I would like to highlight 
certain aspects that are implicit in his presentation, but require more emphasis. 
I think that one of the major breakthroughs in Latin America during the last 
decade was the successful adoption of floating exchange rate regimes. If we recall the 
discussions in the 70s, 80s and even in the early 90s, to think of a small open economy 
moving into a floating exchange rate regime was pretty much like jumping into the unknown. 
The conventional wisdom among economists was that such a regime in a small open 
economy with volatile capital flows would not work, especially as an exit strategy from a 
fixed or managed regime. But history proved them wrong. Some countries had a more 
orderly transition into a floating exchange rate regime, as Chile, but others, like Brazil 
and Mexico, had to enter into it as an inevitable option. By developing derivatives markets, 
having more transparent operation, and adopting adequate regulatory and supervisory 
practices, the floating exchange regimes have worked quite well – price discovery is efficient 
and exchange rates have not been more volatile or unstable than elsewhere –. The huge 
benefit that flexible exchange rates brought to the region was that – in combination 
with consist macro management – it acquired an efficient absorber to external shocks. 
That was obvious during the last years. 
Certainly, this was not only luck or coincidental; it came along with very thoroughly 
revamped macro policymaking, as I have already pointed out. But this revamping has been 
the combination of stronger macro policies together with the regime’s flexibility. And this 
has truly enhanced the capacity of the region to face extremely severe shocks. 
One really cannot stress enough the importance of having the degrees of freedom 
that come with a flexible exchange rate regime. The other day in an academic presentation, 
a professor of a Mexican university was explaining the difference between a fixed and a 
flexible exchange rate regime. He illustrated it with a very good example. He said to imagine 
that you wanted to paint a house. When you have a fixed exchange rate, the brush is fixed 
and you move the house. When you have a floating exchange rate, you have the house 
fixed and you move the brush. He then asked which one we thought was the best way 
to do it. In this setting the answer is obvious. When you have the constraints of a fixed 
exchange rate you basically have constantly to adjust everything else in the economy 
in order for that exchange rate to be sustainable at a certain level, and if you do not have 
that capacity, then you really run into trouble, as a large list of currency crisis in Latin America 
demonstrates it. 
The flexible exchange rate regime worked particularly well in the most recent crisis, 
because it operated in the context of consolidated inflation targeting schemes in most 
Latin American countries. In the past, under fixed or managed exchange rate regimes, 
when an exchange rate variation would take place the impact was immediately and fully 
passed-through to wages and inflation, due to the lack of a consistent macro framework. 
This meant no real exchange rate correction, only more inflation. No wonder these episodes 
were so costly for the region. More recently, given that most countries have an appropriate 
nominal anchor by means of consolidated inflation targeting schemes, nominal exchange 
rate variations has meant to a large extent real exchange rate adjustments, which in turn 
have played the role of shock absorber in response to external shocks. Precisely our recent 
experience illustrates a textbook adjustment through the exchange rate mechanism. I agree 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1102 
with Klaus that the recent world crisis represented a “severe test” for the region, and we 
sailed through with flying colors. 
Moving to another issue I do not feel comfortable with the argument that Klaus 
presents that capital controls and exchange rate intervention are appropriate second-best 
policies. On my list they would be more like fourth- or fifth-best. He recognizes that the 
evidence is not very strong about how successful they are. In my opinion, especially in 
the case of exchange rate intervention, most of the time this policy does not work because, 
at the end of the day, it does not allow the markets to adjust. Under these circumstances the 
incentives for resources to keep flowing into the economy will persist, with the added 
disadvantage that the costs inflicted by the policy will be ever increasing, given the huge 
carry costs of excessive international reserves. The only justification I see for “n-best” 
solutions is the potential usefulness they might have temporarily to staunch political pressures 
on the central bank. Sooner or later exporters will bitterly complain about non-equilibrium 
real exchange appreciation. By adopting an “n-best” solution the central bank has at least 
something to show them: “well, we have put this capital control in place, we are intervening” 
so it takes off some of the pressure. But, at the end of the day, it will not make much of 
a difference given the proven inefficiency of these set of measures. The bottom-line is that a 
nation is better off if it does not introduce distortions in the economy by pursuing short-term 
goals that might have long-term consequences. In the case in point we all know that the 
region will need external capital for years to come and, ultimately, you do not want to gain 
a bad reputation that might scare them away on a more permanent basis. 
Next I would like to comment on the unconventional monetary measures that were 
implemented in many parts of the world as part of the crisis response. Klaus basically 
views them as instruments to provide liquidity assistance. Looking at them from the other 
side of the coin, these measures really represent policies implemented by central banks 
to relief markets from excessive risk. From this point of view central banks became 
“risk-absorbers of last resort”. In the past central banks did not face the need to play this role 
since securities and derivatives in financial markets were not that relevant, given that financial 
intermediation was dominated by banking systems. But more recently the amount of risk 
transformation in financial markets exploded, and now we know that under the existing 
rules and regulations markets have limited capacity to carry all that risk when volatility 
increases substantially, a situation which in turn fed back into more volatility, threatening 
the sustainability of many financial intermediaries. To short-circuit these processes central 
banks, under the excuse of the need to provide liquidity assistance, have absorbed enormous 
amounts of risks. I do not believe that this role of “risk absorber of last resort” should become 
permanent in central banks. We will have to work carefully in the future to prevent this, 
and our success will depend on how we regulate markets on the years to come. 
From a broader point of view, something that concerns me is that as a result of 
the crisis, many central banks have ended carrying an abnormally high load of responsibility. 
We central bankers have extended ourselves into many areas. Many central banks are 
now tackling how to stimulate growth, manage risk absorption, liquidity provision, among 
other tasks, on top of the traditional role of monetary authority pursuing price stability. 
A huge challenge for many central banks in the future will be how they “exit” many of these 
roles and focus on the objectives they have the instruments to achieve. Hopefully this task 
does not end being and exercise of trying to put the genie back inside the bottle. 
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Finally, I would like to say that I agree with many of Klaus´s concluding remarks. 
Fiscal responsibility is very important, as well as financial regulation. Likewise, I share his point 
of view that central banks should embrace more forcefully in their mandates the goal of 
financial stability. I thus believe that we have important challenges ahead. Papers like the one 
presented by Klaus provide valuable food for thought on how to address such challenges. 
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Discussion by Athanasios Orphanides, Governor Central Bank of Cyprus 
It is a great pleasure to discuss this paper on the changes, achievements and challenges of 
central banking in Latin America by Klaus at this Eurosystem and Latin American central 
banking gathering. I’m going to start by noting that Klaus and I have something in common: 
we are both Rudi Dornbusch students. As a student of Rudi during the 1980s, I learnt quite a 
bit about the monetary experiences of Latin America. Rudi routinely used current events 
and present crises as case studies to explain the success and failure of monetary policy 
regimes and institutional arrangements. He also used examples to contrast politically induced 
short-termism against policies that would enhance welfare over the long haul. During the 
1980s there were indeed plenty of examples. However, not all of the examples were from 
Latin America. Some concerned what is now the euro area. For example, after researching 
debt and deficit data for Rudi at the end of the 1980s, it was hard not to be impressed 
by the challenges then facing Belgium. I mention this to cheer us up a little bit because 
it´s never pretty when events force us to refresh our knowledge of debt deficit dynamics, 
but it’s reassuring to know there are examples of countries that managed to come back 
from the brink. 
Turning back to Latin America, the focus of Klaus’ paper, some knowledge of 
historical experiences is, I think, very useful to gain a proper appreciation of the truly 
remarkable advances in central banking practice that have been observed in the region over 
the last two decades. In his survey, Klaus does an excellent job of explaining key changes 
and achievements, and then ends the paper by discussing some challenges for central 
banks both in Latin America and elsewhere. In my discussion I will briefly focus on two areas: 
first, on the sources of the improvement seen in Latin American central bank practice 
that Klaus discusses, and the inflation targeting framework of monetary policy that he uses 
quite often in that regard; second, I will talk a little bit about some of the challenges he 
identifies going forward. 
Regarding the changes in central banking in Latin America, Klaus uses the inflation 
targeting (IT) framework of monetary policy as an organising device for much of his 
discussion, even for non-inflation targeting countries. He considers it to be a useful device 
to that end and I find this quite helpful as well. But I must stress that I have doubts about 
the view that the IT framework is necessarily superior to other frameworks. For example, 
Klaus suggests that IT may even be superior to the price stability approach followed by 
the ECB. I would say that what matters most is an institutional design that retains some 
crucial characteristics that we can all identify as being essential for good policy practice. 
What I think is going on is that those crucial characteristics that Klaus does identify are 
actually shared both by the ECB approach and the canonical inflation targeting framework 
that he discusses. Here I very much agree with Klaus on the bottom line in describing the 
changes and achievements in Latin America: namely, that we have observed improvements 
in central banking practice that have placed many Latin American central banks in the 
group of central banks that can claim to be very close to the benchmark of best practice, 
precisely because these key characteristics have been embedded in the policy framework. 
This couldn’t have been further away from being the case back in the 1980s and is thus 
quite an achievement. 
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Now what are the most important elements for best practice? In my view there are 
two. Central bank independence and the clear commitment by both the state and the 
central bank that price stability is the primary mandate of the central bank. Independence 
must be both in its legal and economic form, and Klaus presents very nice evidence on 
how this has worked for Latin America. He has transparency in policy high on his list, 
and I agree with him. However, I will give you a somewhat different interpretation of the 
aspect of transparency that is most important. Klaus interprets transparency as policy 
bound by ex ante rules and monitored with ex post accountability. I very much favour rules 
as guides for policy discussion, but I believe that the key here is a clear explanation of 
the monetary policy framework, including the goals of policy and how this is going to be 
achieved. This interpretation of the rule is a little bit broader than what Klaus has in mind. 
The key focus should be on the one predominant objective that monetary policy can 
achieve. That is, the crucial feature regarding transparency is what the price stability objective 
is for the central bank, and how the central bank pursues it. This is the broader definition that 
I interpret as equivalent of what Klaus calls the rules approach. The most important element 
of good policy practice by an independent central bank, regardless of whether it is called 
an inflation targeting central bank or not, is a monetary policy framework that focuses 
maximum attention on the objective of price stability and indeed forces close monitoring 
of current and prospective aggregate prices, both as a means to guiding current policy 
and as a means to evaluating past policy action. I take this to be the most distinguishing 
characteristic of inflation targeting and also of the ECB strategy, even though the ECB is 
not an inflation targeting central bank. By encouraging an ongoing open dialogue between 
the central bank, the government, the public and financial market participants, the inflation 
targeting approach leaves little room for neglecting price stability, further reinforcing its 
unique focus. It is for these reasons that inflation targeting may be particularly effective as a 
monetary policy framework for central banks that are institutionally challenged in some way 
before they adopt it. For instance, because they lack a history of political independence or 
because they have an impaired credibility in pursuing monetary stability-oriented policies. 
Latin America in the 1980s fits this description – the initial condition that would benefit most 
by moving in that direction. 
The intrusion of politics into monetary policy decisions as well as the pursuit 
of multiple and possibly conflicting objectives are potential sources of such impaired 
credibility with regard to a central bank’s commitment to achieving and maintaining 
price stability. Inflation targeting helps guard against these forces. Klaus argues, and I am in 
full agreement, the reason the focus on a clear definition of price stability is crucial is that by 
being so transparent on this, the central bank can help anchor inflation expectations in 
the best possible manner. This in turn has multiple benefits for the central bank. For example, 
it allows the central bank flexibility to respond to other disturbances in the economy thus not 
only achieving and maintaining price stability but also contributing to economic and financial 
stability. This action is what Klaus demonstrates with the evidence he provides when he 
compares the response of central banks in Latin America and economic outcomes that 
are associated with the 2008 crisis and with the others that occurred ten years earlier. 
The comparison is very instructive on the benefits of having these institutional improvements. 
As he shows domestic policy helped soften the blow to the economy in the most recent 
episode, and that was not the case at all in the episode ten years earlier. This is a very useful 
demonstration that best practice with an independent central bank, and with a clear definition 
of price stability as its mandate, does indeed deliver better outcomes. 
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I am somewhat more ambivalent about Klaus’ use of adjectives to describe inflation 
targeting, i.e. “partial” versus “fully fledged” IT, even what he calls “flexible” IT. I also disagree 
with his claim about another adjective – “explicit”.  Specifically, I do not agree with him when 
he says “that explicit IT dominates other successful monetary regimes … like those pursued 
by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank …”. Hence to the extent that a 
useful metric of success is how well-anchored inflation expectations are, I do not interpret the 
evidence as suggesting that the performance of IT central banks dominates that of the ECB. 
My greatest concern here is with the so-called flexible inflation targeting framework, used to 
target not just inflation but multiple objectives at the same time. Klaus recommends that 
central banks discuss all the unobserved variables someone would put in a model forecast 
to design optimal control and IT-type policies. This includes very explicitly the natural rate of 
interest, the natural rate of output, the natural rate of unemployment, the natural or equilibrium 
exchange rate, the natural or equilibrium commodity prices, and so on. My fundamental 
disagreement here is that I would argue that robust policy should stay clear from such 
concepts as much as possible to achieve best results regarding price stability. The problem 
with an approach that allows or even encourages policy measures to try to stabilise output 
and unemployment in addition to maintaining price stability is that it can easily transform 
into the sort of fine-tuning approach that achieves none of its multiple targets well. Let us 
remember that we experienced such failures in the past and, indeed, a starting point for 
understanding the useful elements of inflation targeting for me is to comprehend the sources 
and magnitude of the failure in some of the countries that adopted it. I find the case of 
New Zealand, the pioneer of the approach, particularly instructive. 
Prior to the mid-1980s, New Zealand had the unenviable record of one of the highest 
rates of inflation in the OECD. Inflation exceeded 10% per annum for almost an entire decade. 
According to Don Brash, the Governor who implemented inflation targeting at the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, the problem with the price stability mandate was that it was only 
one of several goals. As he put it: “The legislation under which we operated required us 
to have regard for the inflation rate, employment, growth, motherhood and a range of other 
good things” [Brash (1999), p. 36)]. The Reserve Bank was also hampered by its lack of 
operational independence. 
These weaknesses were corrected by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, 1989. 
The price stability remit was given prominence. As section 8 of the Act states: “The primary 
function of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic 
objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices”. No ifs, no buts, 
no other things. Section 9 of the Act requires a numerical target for inflation to be agreed 
between the Governor and the Minister of Finance, and section 10 ensures the Bank’s 
operational independence. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, 1989 thus describes the two defining 
characteristics of the economic and inflation targeting approach where we started from. 
First defining a hierarchical mandate for the central bank with price stability, a clear definition 
of price stability, and second, providing the central bank with the independence to pursue 
this objective. And this is what many others followed in one way or another. These are 
precisely the two characteristics that Klaus stressed as crucial and which are common 
to the institutional design of the ECB. 
Let me now turn to Klaus’ discussion of some challenges for the future. I would 
focus on just three elements. 
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First, the implications of the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest 
rate. Here Klaus seems to take it for granted that monetary policy is constrained by the zero 
lower bound, and thus explores ways to reduce the likelihood of hitting the lower bound. 
For example, he talks about the possibility of raising the numerical definition of price stability 
which, as he recognises, creates other problems. On this point the underlying premise is, 
in my opinion, flawed. It is based on the so-called liquidity trap, suggesting that no additional 
monetary policies can be implemented once the short-term nominal interest rate is close to 
zero. But as we know, for example from Brunner and Meltzer’s arguments from the 1960s 
[Brunner and Meltzer (1968)] and by others since, this is a conceptual mistake. The liquidity 
trap concept is seriously flawed because it can only be proven to hold in a model under some 
unrealistic assumptions, and is understood to be false once those assumptions are relaxed. 
Such academic exercises can be useful to sharpen discussions, but they can become quite 
harmful if they permeate into policy debates. In practice, non-standard measures can be 
employed to engineer additional monetary policy easing if and when needed at the zero 
bound, and there is no need to abandon a definition of price stability that has otherwise been 
deemed to be perfectly fine just in order to protect against the possibility of the zero bound. 
The second element is whether a central bank should lean against the wind to 
protect against nascent imbalances. Here the discussion in the paper needs some 
clarification. The answer may be different depending on whether the central bank has, 
in addition to monetary policy, a role in prudential supervision or not. Klaus actually alludes 
to this, making the distinction between macro-prudential measures and monetary policy. 
In my view, central banks should have banking supervision responsibilities also, but not all 
central banks do. For those central banks that do have the additional tools that can be used 
for macro-prudential purposes, then clearly those tools must be incorporated into the broader 
stability-oriented policy design. 
There are two examples that help illustrate how the impact of the credit boom prior 
to the most recent crisis could have actually been reduced by central banks employing 
prudential supervision tools. One is the practice of dynamic provisioning, i.e. asking banks 
to raise provisions in good times. The boom may thus be tempered and bigger shocks 
can be absorbed in bad times. This worked well in Spain. The second is macro-prudential 
adjustment of loan-to-value ratios. This was adopted with some success in my own country, 
Cyprus, in 2007 and 2008. In July 2007, one month before the onset of the crisis, while the 
real estate party was in full swing, we tightened conditions on real estate loans, capping 
the maximum loan-to-value ratio, except for owner-occupied housing, to just 60%. Some 
developers took the hint and cut back on their plans. Others complained quite a bit and 
we faced a lot of criticism, which was evidence that the policy was effective. This policy 
action was one of the reasons why our banking system was shielded from the shocks and 
aftershocks of what happened following September 2008. Although we had a real estate 
price boom it was tempered and the banking sector was protected from it. 
I will conclude with a remark about another challenge raised by Klaus: fiscal policy. 
Here I urge Klaus to flesh out more the successes in Latin America. I find particularly 
important the discussion regarding the establishment of fiscal councils and fiscal rules. Klaus 
is certainly right; the way forward is conceptually straightforward but politically fraught with 
difficulties. This appears to be a crucial missing link in designing an institutional framework 
that ensures stability going forward. 
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